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PART I: INTRODUCTION 
After a year of attempting to conceive a child naturally, Tara and Jacob decide to 
consult a fertility specialist who suggests that they undergo in vitro fertilization (IVF). 
Tara has oocyte retrieval. Her eggs are subsequently combined with Jacob's sperm in the 
laboratory, and six embryos are created as a result. Three embryos are transferred into 
Tara's uterus, and the remaining embryos are cryopreserved for future use. Tara 
successfully conceives a child, and nine months later the couple becomes parents to a 
healthy baby girl. Unfortunately, Tara and Jacob's marriage begins to deteriorate and the 
couple files for a divorce. Notwithstanding the end of their union, Tara is eager to have 
another child and would like to initiate a pregnancy through the use of the remaining 
embryos. Jacob, on the other hand, would like to have the embryos destroyed. Which of 
them should prevail? 
Although Tara and Jacob are a hypothetical example, their problem is becoming 
increasingly real for couples that tum to Assisted Reproductive Technology ("ART"). In 
the United States, approximately 500,000 embryos are stored in a cryogenic state without 
a definitive plan for their disposition.1 When the intended parents no longer agree on the 
fate of their embryos, they ask the court to resolve this controversial issue for them. 
Although courts employ a number of approaches to decide embryo disposition disputes, 
none of them lead to satisfactory outcomes. The three adversarial approaches are: 1) 
constitutional model, 2) contractual model, and 3) mutual consent model. 
1 Molly O'Brien, An Intersection of Ethics and Law: The Frozen Embryo Dilemma and 
the Chilling Choice Between Life and Death, 32 WHITTIER L. REv. 171 (2010). 
The problematic nature of adversarial model stems from its over-simplified 
presumptions of progenitors' interests and intentions. Under the current system, 
progenitors surrender their beliefs, intentions, and unique circumstances from being 
considered in the resolution process. 2 Courts frequently overlook the highly sensitive 
nature of disputes that involve a pot~ntial birth of a child and instead choose to 
relentlessly employ a rigid analytical framework. Instead of setting bright line rules, 
courts should attempt to create more a flexible standard that considers the unique 
circumstances of each dispute. Flexibility of the alternative dispute resolution model 
allows parties to deliberate on the issues that are outside the scope of the current legal 
frameworks and come forward with creative solutions that are not available under the 
adversarial model. 3 
PART II: THE RELEVANT ISSUES AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER 
WHICH DISPUTES ARISE 
As advances in reproductive technologies become more prominent, couples that 
are unable to naturally conceive a child increasingly tum to ART.4 One of the most 
widely utilized methods of ART is in vitro fertilization ("IVF").5 During IVF, a female's 
egg cells are fertilized by a male's sperm in a laboratory setting and allowed to divide 
into eight-cell embryos. 6 The resulting embryos are either implanted in the uterus of the 
2 Kass v. Kass, 91 N.Y.2d 554, 563, 696 N.E.2d 174, 179 (1998). 
3 Edward Brunet & Charles B. Craver, Alternative Dispute Resolution: The Advocate's 
Perspective 4 (1997). 
4 Wendy Wendland, Adopting Frozen Embryos; More Hope for Infertile Couples, CHI. 
TRIB., Jan. 15, 2001, at 3. 
s John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA. L. 
REv. 437,441 (1990). 
6 !d. 
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female or cryogenically preserved for possible future use. 7 Today's advanced 
preservation techniques allow embryos to remain viable for years after they have been 
created.8 
At times, the cryopreserved embryos outlast the relationship of their intended 
parents. Although the certain aspects of each dispute significantly differ, the essential 
plot line remains the same. After more than a year of unsuccessful attempts to conceive a 
child, the couple seeks IVF treatment. A number of embryos are successfully created, 
some of which are cryogenically preserved for potential future use. The relationship 
between the intended parents begins to deteriorate and they file for a divorce. During the 
divorce proceeding, one party seeks to have the embryos brought to term. The other 
party seeks to have the embryos destroyed, donated to another couple, or left in the 
preserved state. Since the parties are unable to agree on disposition of the embryos, they 
turn to the judicial system for resolutions. 
A. Fundamental Determinations 
To successful ascertain an analytical framework that will guide the embryo 
disposition proceeding, the court must make two fundamental determinations. First, the 
court must assign a legal status to the embryo.9 Second, the court must determine which 
of the progenitors interests will be legally recognized. 10 Once the embryo status is 
7 Id 
8 See Embryo Cryopreservation Reaches 20 Year Milestone, http:// 
http://www.infertilitydoctor.com/2004/03/02/embryo-cryopreservation-reaches-20-year-
milestone/ (last visited Nov. 01, 2011). 
9 Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 594-97 (Tenn. 1992) on reh'g in part~ 34, 1992 WL 
341632 (Tenn. Nov. 23, 1992). 
10 Ruth Calker, Pregnant Men Revisited or Sperm Is Cheap, Eggs Are Not, 47 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1063, 1066-69 (1996). 
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assigned and the legally recognized interests are determined, the court can decide which 
of the three adversarial methods would resolve the dispute in the best manner. 
I. Determination of Embryo Status 
Presently, courts have characterized embryos as either: 1) property, 11 2) property 
deserving of special respect, 12 or 3) human life. 13 
If the court chooses to characterize embryo as "property," the dispute will be 
resolved under contract and property law principles. 14 Consequently, considerations that 
become material to the resolution of the embryo dispute are interpretation and 
enforceability of the contract as well as application of marital property law. 15 In York v. 
Jones, the court classified embryos as "property," and held the fertility clinic was liable 
for unlawful conversion of property when the clinic refused to release the embryos to the 
progenitors. 16 However, courts are generally reluctant to characterize embryos as plain 
"property."17 Such classification essentially eradicates parties' interest in embryos for its 
potential to develop into live beings. 18 
Contrary to Jones, the Louisiana Legislature statutorily classified embryo as 
"person."19 The statute directs courts to resolve embryo disputes in accordance with 
"best interest of the in vitro fertilized ovum. "20 Since the standard closely resembles that 
11 York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 424-27 (E.D. Va. 1989). 
12 Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597. 
13 La. Rev. Stat. Ann.§§ 9:121 (2011). 
14 John A. Robertson, Prior Agreements for Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 51 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 407,409-10 (1990). 
15 Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 179-81 (1998). 
16 York, 717 F. Supp. at 426-27. 
17 See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 596-97; See also Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 178-79. 
18 !d. 
19 § 9:123. 
20 § 9:131. 
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of "best interest of the child,), it is hard to presume that courts would rule in any way 
other than in favor of progenitor seeking in1plantation.21 Otherwise, courts would be 
forced to "weigh the value of being versus nonbeing,)) which is a controversial issues that 
is frequently viewed as being inappropriate for courts?2 Furthermore, classifying embryo 
as "person)) invokes constitutionally protected rights that are powerful enough to 
potentially outlaw IVF programs?3 For the forgoing reasons, Louisiana is the only 
jurisdiction that characterizes embryos as "persons." 
The most broadly adopted embryo status is "property deserving special respect.))24 
The court in Davis v. Davis was the first to adopt the "special respect'' classification. 25 
The court recognized that embryo's ability to develop into a live being through 
implantation and gestation makes it more than plain property. 26 Under "special respect') 
classification, progenitors have "an interest in the nature of ownership, to the extent that 
they have decision-making authority concerning disposition of the preembryos, within 
the scope of policy set by law."27 The "special respect') designation allows progenitors to 
contract regarding disposition of embryos.28 Moreover, this designation elicits 
progenitors' constitutional interests in procreation.29 The status of"special respect" does 
not confine courts to strict bounds of property or family law, and leaves some ambiguity 
21 Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on 
Parents' Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REv. 1747, 1755-56 (1993). 
22 Hester v. Dwivedi, 733 N.E.2d 1161, 1164 (Ohio 2000) (quoting Bowman v. Davis, 
356 N.E.2d 496, 499 nJ (Ohio 1976)). 
23 Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 595. 
24 !d. at 597. 
25 !d. 
26 !d. at 596-97. 
27 !d. 
28 !d. at 597-98. 
29 !d. 
5 
in the analytical framework.30 However, courts that adopted "special respect" status 
typically treat embryos more as property rather than person. This is evident by courts' 
willingness to allow destruction or donation of embryos to research, and freedom to 
contract on their disposition. 31 
2. The Legally Recognized Interests and The Role of Progenitors 
An equally important issue in resolution of embryo disputes is the determination 
of legally recognized interests of progenitors. Since both progenitors contribute their 
genetic material to the creation of embryo, they both have a substantial interest in the 
outcome of the dispute. 32 Although courts unanimously agree that progenitors have 
interests in disposition of embryos, courts are unable to come to a consensus on the 
nature of those interests.33 In fact, procreation and parenthood are the only interests that 
courts have universally recognized.34 Consequently, numerous significant interests such 
as belief in preservation of human life35, disproportionately greater involvement of 
women in creation of embryos36, as well possibility of viewing the issue from the best 
interest of the child37 have been ignored. 
Courts also disregard circumstances surrounding the parties' relationship prior to 
disassociation. Typically, when intended parents enter IVF treatment they are involved 
30 !d. at 594-97. 
31 !d. at 597. 
32Jd. 
33 Colker, supra note 10, at 1066-69. 
34 See Id 
35 J.B. v. M.B., 170 N.J. 9, 15, 783 A.2d 707, 711 (2001). 
36 Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 600 (Tenn. 1992). 
37 In reMarriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 774 (Iowa 2003). 
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in a committed relationship with hopes of becoming parents in the near future. 38 Ideally, 
a couple would undergo IVF treatment because both progenitors seek to achieve 
parenthood. However, there are instances when coercion and desperate attempts to avoid 
conflicts could force a progenitor to agree to IVF. This is precisely the reason some 
scholars have argued that agreements between couples prior to their separation should be 
viewed as highly suspect.39 Nevertheless, courts do not conduct a fact intensive analysis 
that would allow them to uncover such instances. 
Another important consideration that is frequently disregarded by courts is 
reliance. 40 Some progenitors choose to undergo IVF because of medical conditions that 
render them unable to have biological children in the future.41 Whether those progenitors 
should be granted a special consideration is a contested issue, which only a few courts 
have addressed.42 The court in Davis held that progenitor who is unable to have a child 
through any means other than implantation would be awarded the embryos 
notwithstanding the other party's opposition.43 However, if adoption is a viable option, 
progenitor will be deprived of the only chance to have a genetically related child. 
Another consideration that is overlooked by courts, but is frequently discussed by 
the academics, is the disproportionate burden and physical commitment that females have 
to endure during IVF process. 44 Typically, an intended mother undergoes months of 
38 Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice: An Inalienable 
Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REv. 55, 97-104 (1999). 
39 !d. at 102-04. 
40 !d. at 102. 
41 Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 175 (1998). 
42 Robertson, supra note 14, at 414-16. 
43 Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 603-05 (Tenn. 1992). 
44 John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA. L. 
REv. 437, 441-46 (1990). 
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hormonal therapy, painful egg extractions, and a harvesting process.45 The unequivocally 
greater burden on the woman has led to a proposed presumption in favor of the fen1ale 
progenitor's preference.46 Despite the fact that courts have not adopted this presumption, 
women's often painful and life-altering involvements in IVF should not be left without 
proper respect and recognition. 
PART III: CURRENT JUDICIAL RESOLUTION APPROACHES 
Currently, there are three judicial approaches that have been employed by courts 
in embryo disposition disputes. Fist, constitutional approach centers on balancing each 
progenitor's interests in procreation. Second, contractual approach primarily focuses on 
prior directives signed by the intended parents. Last, contemporaneous mutual consent 
approach seeks to preserve status quo until parties can reach a consensus. 
A. Constitutional Model: Balancing Interests in Procreation 
The constitutional model focuses on balancing each progenitor's constitutionally 
protected interest in procreation. The court in Davis v. Davis was the first to implement 
the balancing test as the controlling analytical framework in resolution of the dispute.47 
The court in Davis held that generally disputes between intended parents should be 
decided according to prior directives created by the parties. 48 However, since the Davises 
did not enter into an express agreement regarding disposition of the embryos, the dispute 
was resolved by examining their constitutional rights to privacy.49 
45 Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601-02. 
46 Lori B. Andrews, The Legal Status of the Embryo, 32 LoY. L. REv. 357,403 (1986). 
47 Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588. 
48 !d. at 597. 
49 !d. at 598-603. 
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The court held that "a vital part of individual's right to privacy" is the right to 
procreate and the right to avoid procreation, each being of equal significance. 50 In the 
process of balancing these conflicting rights, the court analyzed the "positions of the , 
[progenitors], the significance of their interests, and the relative burdens that [would] be 
imposed by differing resolutions."51 However, the dispositive factor transpired from 
weighing the burden of "unwanted parenthood" that would be imposed on the intended 
father against the intended mother's desire to donate the embryo to another couple. 52 
The court held that the burden of unwanted parenthood outweighed the desire to 
donate the embryo to another couple. 53 Consequently, the intended father was granted 
the control over embryos. 54 The court found the intended mother's interests to be less 
significant because she did not seek to use the embryos for her own use. 55 Moreover, she 
was physically able to undergo another round of IVF if she wished to become a parent in 
the future. 56 On the other hand, if embryos were donated to another couple, the father 
"would face a lifetime of either wondering about his parental status or knowing about his 
parental status but having no control over it."57 
Courts continue to rule in favor of progenitors who seek to discard embryos. 58 
Courts justify this generalized outcome by emphasizing the concern of forever foregoing 
5o Id at 600-01. 
51 Id at 603. 
52 Id at 604. 
53Jd 
54Jd 
55Jd 
56 !d. 
57 !d. 
58 J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d at 707, 719-20 (2001). 
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the right to avoid procreation if implantation leads to childbirth. 59 According to judges, 
birth of a biologically related child would lead to "life-long en1otional and psychological 
repercussions. "60 This presumption coupled with judges' limited inquiry into 
circumstances surrounding the dispute make judges reluctant to grant embryos to 
progenitor seeking implantation. 
Although courts refer to the right to procreate and avoid procreation as being 
equal, as of today, no court has awarded control over embryos to the progenitor seeking 
implantation.61 Moreover, the only recognized exception to this general outcome arises 
when progenitor is unable to achieve parenthood through any other means, potentially 
even adoption. 62 Total inability to achieve parenthood appears to be the threshold 
requirement that procreation-seeking progenitors have to show to be granted a chance at 
succeeding in litigation.63 However, as of today, this narrow exception has not been 
invoked in judicial proceedings. 
B.. Contractual Model: Enforcement of Prior Directives 
The predominant approach used by courts to resolve embryo disputes is the 
contractual model, which focuses on progenitors' initial intent. Seven of the ten appellate 
decisions involving embryo disputes implemented the contractual approach. 64 In rare 
instances do progenitors create agreements among themselves regarding disposition of 
59 JB., 783 A.2d at 719-20. 
60 Id 
61 Mark P. Strasser, You Take the Embryos but I Get the House (and the Business): 
Recent Trends in Awards Involving Embryos Upon Divorce, 57 BUFF. L. REv. 1159, 1224 
(2009); see also Margaret E. Swain, What Art Clients Don't Know Can Hurt Them!, FAM. 
Anvoc., Fall2011, at 18, 20. 
62 Deborah L. Forman, Embryo Disposition and Divorce: Why Clinic Consent Forms Are 
Not the Answer, 24 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 57,62 (2011). 
63 See !d. 
64 Forman, supra note 62, at 66. 
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the unused embryos. 65 However, most progenitors are required to complete informed 
consent forms provided by clinics prior to undergoing an IVF procedure.66 Typically, 
every informed consent form asks progenitors to specify what they intend to do with the 
remaining preserved embryos in case of divorce, death, or other events that will inhibit 
them from jointly deciding on the disposition question.67 Although consent forms are 
agreements created between progenitors and IVF clinics rather than parties directly, 
courts have been eager to utilize these forms as interpretative guides to parties' initial 
intent.68 
Courts have not hesitated to enforce parties' prior directives when those directives 
called for destruction or donation of frozen embryos. 69 The leading case on contractual 
approach, Kass v. Kass, held that prior directive created by parties are a reliable 
manifestation of their intent. 70 Moreover, those directives are "presumed valid and 
binding, and [will be] enforced." 71 According to the Kass court, strict adherence to prior 
agreements creates predictability that all parties can rely on. 72 Since progenitors are the 
ones who made the choice on the consent form, there is no uncertainty left for courts to 
decide.73 
65 Ellen A. Waldman, Disputing over Embryos: Of Contracts and Consents, 32 ARiz. ST. 
L.J. 897, 918-33 (2000). 
66Jd 
67 See Coleman, supra note 38, at 109-17. 
68 Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (1998). 
69 Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40,52 (Tex. App. 2006); Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180, In re 
Marriage of Dahl, 2008 WL 4490304 (Or. Ct. App. 2008); Cahill v. Cahill, 757 So.2d 
465,467 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000); Karmasu v. Karmasu, 2009 WL 3155062 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2009); Dodson v. Univ. of Ark. forMed. Sci., 601 FJd 750 (8th Cir. 2010). 
70Jd 
11Jd. 
12Jd. 
73 Id 
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Courts acknowledge, yet dismiss, significant deficiencies that are associated with 
contractual approach. Judges recognize that sometimes couples may place a checkmark 
on a consent forms without considering the implication of that choice. 74 Furthermore, 
embryos' prolonged viability gives couples ample opportunities to change their minds 
regarding disposition of the embryos. 75 Yet, courts state that predictability overrides 
these very important concerns. 76 
Litowitz v. Litowitz is an excellent illustration of the dangers associated with 
contractual model. 77 The court in Litowitz enforced a prior directive that was contrary to 
the requests of both parties. 78 During the litigation proceeding, the intended mother was 
asking the court to allow the embryos to be used for implantation in a surrogate, while the 
intended father requested the embryos to be donated to another couple. 79 
The court chose to resolve the couple's dispute by relying on the cryopreservation 
contract signed by the Litowitzs prior to undergoing IVF. 80 According to the 
cryopreservation contract, the couple agreed that the embryos would be cryopreserved for 
five years.81 Upon expiration of the five year period, the couple had the option to request 
the preservation to be prolonged, otherwise, the embryos would" 'be thawed but not 
allowed to undergo further development' "82 The court held that since the couple did not 
74Jd. 
75Jd 
76Jd 
77 48 PJd 261 (Wash. 2002). 
78 Litowitz, 48 P.3d at 263. 
79 Id 
80 /dat 267-68. 
81 /dat 268. 
82Jd. 
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seek an extension and the five years have elapsed, the embryos should be discarded in 
accordance with the prior directive. 83 
The Litowitz court precluded both parties from exercising their rights to the 
embryos. 84 Furthermore, the court contradicted the fundamental conviction of the 
contractual approach which is "[t]o the extent possible, it should be the progenitors-not 
the State and not the courts-who ... make this deeply personal life choice."85 
C. Contemporaneous Mutual Consent Model 
The last approach that courts have employed to resolve embryo disputes is the 
contemporaneous mutual consent model. First adopted by the court in In re Marriage of 
Witten, mutual consent model focuses on the present, as opposed to initial, intent of 
progenitors. 86 The court in Witten explained its decision for adopting the new approach 
by highlighting the inherent inadequacies of the contractual model. 87 The court found 
that couples that choose to undergo IVF treatment are more likely to make decision based 
on impulse and emotions rather than "rational deliberations. "88 Furthermore, wrongful 
predictions regarding how one will feel about his decisions in the future can have "grave 
repercussions. "89 Enforcement of prior directive could force individuals to make life-
altering adjustments to accommodate for the birth of a child and the associated 
responsibilities of childrearing. On the other hand, a person could be deprived of the 
83 Id at 269-272. 
84 Jd. 
85 Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (1998). 
86 672 N.W.2d 768, 777-83 (Iowa 2003). 
87 Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 779-83. 
88 !d. at 777. 
89 !d. at 778. 
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only chance to have a genetically related child, resulting in devastating effects on the 
person's physical and emotional wellbeing. 
The court in Witten chose to refrain from making such life-altering decisions. The 
court concluded that in situations when progenitors no longer agree regarding disposition 
of their embryos, the court would preserve status quo until the parties can reach a 
"mutually satisfactory" decision.90 Until parties reach an agreement, the party opposing 
destruction will be responsible for the associated fees of keeping the embryos 
cryogenically preserved.91 
PART IV: THE INADEQUECIES OF ADERSARIAL APPROACHES 
Although the judicial system employs numerous approaches to resolve embryo 
disputes, the substantial deficiencies associated with each approach prevent them from 
effectively fulfilling their function. 
A. The Balancing Test 
Application of the balancing test in resolution of embryo disputes appears to be 
more of a pretextual practice rather than a legitimate balancing of progenitors' 
constitutional rights. Courts that adopted the balancing test have acknowledged that the 
right to avoid procreation will generally prevail, unless no other reasonable means to 
achieve parenthood exist.92 However, as previously mentioned, no court has every 
invoked the exception and awarded custody over embryos to the party seeking 
90 !d. at 783. 
91Jd 
92 See Davis v. Davis, 842 S. W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992); see also J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 
at 707, 720 (2001). 
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implantation.93 Therefore, the exception can be accurately classified as a "bright line 
escape hatch,)' rather than an applicable standard.94 
An "escape hatch" is a tool that judges can use to formulate bright-line rules.95 
Essentially, "[t]he escape hatch permits the [ c ]ourt to create predictable, clear-cut rules 
that cover virtually all relevant situations without completely sacrificing flexibility or 
permitting those protected by the rule to flagrantly abuse their trust. "96 In the context of 
embryo disputes, courts created a bright line rule against forced procreation with an 
"extremely narrow and possibly futile exception."97 
Feminist legal scholars have argued that resolution of embryo disputes through 
application of the balancing test inhibits a woman's ability to exercise her interests in 
procreation.98 Since the party seeking implantation is generally a female, the law, in 
effect, discriminates against females by always granting embryos to the party seeking to 
avoid procreation.99 Moreover, female's contribution to IVF process is incomparably 
93 Jennifer L. Medenwald, A "Frozen Exception" for the Frozen Embryo: The Davis 
"Reasonable Alternatives Exception," 76 IND. L.J. 507, 519 (2001). 
94 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term--Foreword: The Justices of 
Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REv. 22, 25, 87 (1992). 
95 James G. Wilson, Surveying the Forms of Doctrine on the Bright Line-Balancing Test 
Continuum, 27 ARiz. ST. L.J. 773, 788 (1995). 
96 !d. at 790. 
97 Kimberly Berg, Special Respect: For Embryos and Progenitors, 74 GEO. WASH. L. 
REv. 506, 518 (2006). 
98 See, e.g., In reMarriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 783 (Iowa 2003).; A.Z. v. B.Z., 
725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057-58 (Mass. 2000); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d at 707, 716 (2001); Kass 
v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 181 (1998); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 603 (Tenn. 1992). 
99 Judith F. Daar, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pregnancy Process: 
Developing an Equality Model to Protect Reproductive Liberties, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 
455, 466 (1999). 
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greater than male's. Yet, women's rights are essentially eviscerated under the 
presumptive rule of procreation avoidance. 100 
B. The Contractual Model 
The contractual model has been criticized as a significantly problematic approach. 
First of all, courts have acknowledged that couples never perceive clinical informed 
consent forms as binding between them. 101 Rather the intended parents perceive the 
forms as a contract between them and the IVF clinic. 102 Consequently, an informed 
consent form "does not represent the progenitors' intent to direct a disposition for the 
embryos [dispute] when they no longer agree about their pursuit ofiVF treatment."103 
Furthermore, the rigid construct of the contractual model does not account for 
changes in circumstances that couples cannot predict when they begin IVF process. 104 
For instance, the intended mother may suffer a medical condition that renders her unable 
to have genetically related children without the use of the preserved embryos.105 
Moreover, one of the progenitors may experience serious financial difficulties post 
divorce, yet be forced to become a parent and financially support the child. 106 Inability to 
predict the future and the changing circumstances is an important factor that is 
disregarded by judges under the contractual approach. 
1oo Andrews, supra note 46, 358-59. 
101 Angela K. Upchurch, A Postmodern Deconstruction of Frozen Embryo Disputes, 39 
CoNN. L. REv. 2107, 2125 (2007). 
102 !d. 
103 !d. 
104 See In reMarriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 781 (Iowa 2003). 
105 See Coleman, supra note 38, at 97-104. 
106 ld. 
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Some statistical data suggests that couples that undergo IVF treatment are 
prevalent to altering their initial embryo disposition decision. 107 An IVF clinic at 
Northwestern University conducted a study that observed 41 post-IVF couples and their 
decisions regarding cryopreserved embryos. 108 Upon expiration of the three-year storage 
deadline, "only 12 of these couples (29 percent) kept their initial disposition choice; 29 
couples (71 percent) changed their preferences."109 Despite the small sample size, the 
study reveals important patterns in intended parent's behavior that courts should not 
1gnore. 
Contractual approach has also been criticized for enforcing ambiguous consent 
forms and disregarding public policy concerns. 110 In A.Z v. B.Z., the court rejected 
enforcement of a prior directive, finding that the directive did not represent clear 
intentions of the parties regarding disposition of the embryos in the event of a future 
dispute. 111 The court also expanded its analysis to prior directives in instances when no 
issue of ambiguity was present. 112 The court held that agreements, which expressly grant 
control of the embryos to the progenitor seeking implantation, should never be enforced 
over the objection of the other party. 113 Such agreements would result in one progenitor 
becoming a parent against his will. 114 The court held that "forced procreation is not an 
107 Susan C. Klock et al., The Disposition of Unused Frozen Embryos, 345 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 69 (2001). 
108 !d. at 69. 
109 ld 
11o A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1056-57 (Mass. 2000). 
111 A.Z, 725 N.E.2d at 1056-58. 
112 Id at 1057-58. 
113 /d. at 1056-58. 
114 /d. at 1057. 
17 
area amendable to judicial enforcement" and would violate public policy. 115 The court 
equated embryo disposition contracts to other familiar contracts such as promise to marry 
and give up a child for adoption prior to birth, which are in violate public policy and are 
not enforceable. 116 
C. Contemporaneous Mutual Assent 
Although at the outset the contemporaneous mutual assent model appears to be 
neutral towards both parties in a dispute, in actuality, it favors the party seeking 
procreation avoidance. By imposing storage fees on the party opposing destruction of 
embryos, the court essentially suggests that the person wishing to avoid procreation "has 
an unparalleled interest in preserving this right."117 If courts considered the right to 
procreate to be of equal importance, then both parties would be compelled to carry the 
financial burden of continued storage.118 By forcing the party who opposes destruction to 
pay continuous storage fees, "the court not only ignores this party's procreative rights but 
effectively punishes that party for pursuing those rights."119 
Furthermore, "rather than giving control to the individual, the status quo strips 
control from the individuals by giving equal power to both progenitors who are free to 
oppose one another."120 Status quo approach provides no incentive for the party seeking 
embryo destruction to come to a consensus with his former spouse. 121 Consequently, the 
115 !d. at 1058. 
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party seeking destruction can have their wishes indirectly fulfilled by holding the 
embryos indefinitely preserved or at least until they are no longer viable for implantation. 
D. The Main Issue Associated With All Adversarial Approaches 
Regardless of the approach courts choose to adopt, the outcome is remarkably the 
same: avoidance ofprocreation.122 If the judicial analysis is based on balancing the 
constitutional right to procreate and avoid procreation, the right to avoid procreation is 
seen as supreme and consequently prevails. 123 If a prior directive with "conflicting" and 
"ambiguous" terms exists, courts nevertheless find that the contract represents a "clear" 
manifestation of the parties' intent to either donate or destroy the embryo. 124 
Furthermore, when contracts explicitly call for awarding the embryos to the party seeking 
procreation, courts find such contracts contrary to public policy and therefore 
unenforceable.125 Evidently, if one of the gamete donors opposes implantation, it is 
virtually impossible for the other donor to prevail in the dispute. 
Remarkably, the prejudicial favoritism toward procreation avoidance has no legal 
justification. There is no constitutional basis for granting the right to avoid procreation 
greater significance. 126 Furthermore, contract law generally does not release from 
liability parties that are contractually bound to commitments in adoption, surrogacy, or 
egg and sperm donation, despite ambiguities or public policy concerns that may 
122 Ellen Waldman & Marybeth Herald, Eyes Wide Shut: Erasing Women's Experiences 
from the Clinic to the Courtroom, 28 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 285, 320 (2005). 
123 See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 602 (Tenn. 1992); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d at 
707, 716-17 (2001). 
124 See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 181-82 (1998); Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 773. 
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accompany those agreements. 127 Instead, the preferentialism toward procreation 
avoidance rests upon preconceived notions of the role that biological ties play in parental 
attachment to a child. 128 
Contrary to courts' preconceived notions, a large body of social science data 
suggests that biology is not a determinant factor in formation of attachment to a child. 129 
Instead, parental attachment is viewed as a "social construct," which is very context-
specific and depends upon various societal influences. 130 Researchers have identified at 
least five predictive factors of parental "disengagement."131 First, a considerable 
geographic distance that prevents physical visitations may sever the relationship between 
a parent and a child. 132 Second, quality of one's relationship with the other spouse is a 
strong indicator of parental involvement. 133 A diminished father-child bond usually 
127 See, e.g., In re Brittany H., 243 Cal. Rptr. 763 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); In re Marriage of 
Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); Mcintyre v. Crouch, 780 P.2d 239 
(Or. Ct. App. 1989). 
128 Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 592-93. 
129 See, e.g., Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr. & Kathleen Mullan Harris, The Disappearing 
American Father? Divorce and the Waning Significance of Biological Parenthood, in 
THE CHANGING AMERICAN FAMILY: SOCIOLOGICAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVES 
197, 214-18 (Scott J. South & Stewart E. Tolnay eds., 1992); Gina R. Hijjawi et al., An 
Exploratory Analysis of Father Involvement in Low-Income Families (2003), available at 
http://crcw.princeton.edu/workingpapers/WP03-0 1-FF-Hijjawi.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 
2011). 
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results when a romantic relationship between the father and the mother ends.134 
Moreover, the parent-child relationship usually suffers if the father proceeds to have a 
family with a new partner.135 Next, a father's financial inability to provide for the child 
usually leads to his emotional detachment from the child. 136 Lastly, community, peers, 
and family relations influence the strength of the bond that develops between a parent and 
a child. 137 In communities where pregnancy and childrearing frequently occur without 
paternal involvement, genetic connections are viewed as weak indicators of whether a 
man will assume a fatherly role in the child's life. 138 Similarly, young adults who do not 
share strong bonds with their fathers usually develop detachment from their own 
children. 139 
Evidently, presence of biological ties alone does not lead to lifelong psychological 
ties. Therefore, courts' relentless imposition of procreation avoidance is meritless. 
Instead of asking "What does the data on psychological parenthood actually show?" 
judges ask, "Can I think of any illustrations where such psychological harm might 
result?"14° Certainly there will be instances where biological ties coupled with 
predisposition of social factors will lead to strong emotional ties. 141 However, typical 
134 Jd 
135 See generally Frank F. Furstenberg, Good Dads-Bad Dads: Two Faces of Fatherhood, 
in THE CHANGING AMERICAN FAMILY AND PUBLIC POLICY 193, 203-04 (Andrew J. 
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circumstances stuTounding embryos disputes point to the opposite conclusion. 142 It is 
unjust for courts to create unsubstantiated presumptions of psychological attachments that 
deprive progenitors from a tangible opportunity to exercise their procreational rights. 
PART IV: Alternative Dispute Resolution: Mending the Adversarial Deficiencies 
To avoid issues commonly associated with adversarial process, embryo disputes 
should be decided under an alternative dispute resolution called arbitration. Unlike 
adversarial judicial process, arbitration allows for greater flexibility without constraints 
of overly simplistic tests. 143 Moreover, arbitration is not limited to principles of contracts 
or legally recognized interests of progenitors. 144 The alternative dispute resolution model 
allows progenitors to tailor the resolution analysis according to their true individual 
interests. 145 
Arbitration is the most suitable form of alternative dispute resolution in instances 
when parties do not believe they can jointly reach an amicable solution. 146 An arbitrator 
is a neutral third party chosen by progenitors to render a binding decision in their 
dispute. 147 Parties are free to choose someone with expertise in family law, whom they 
both "respect and feel comfortable making decisions that will greatly affect their 
142Jd 
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lives."148 Since arbitration proceeding is not bound by substantive law or legal precedent) 
it allows for "greater self-determination of the process by the participants."149 Due to the 
greater self-determination, the parties are generally more accepting of the final decision 
and are less likely to experience resentment or hostility toward each other. 150 
Arbitration's reduced emphasis on formality of the process allows parties to settle 
disputes in a time and cost efficient manner. 151 Extensive backlogs associated with 
majority of court systems substantiality prolong the duration of embryo disputes. 152 On 
the other hand, arbitration allows parties to choose the date and time when the arbitration 
will take place. 153 The efficiency of the process reduces the associated costs) thereby, 
making arbitration a financially accessible option for couples that cannot afford 
litigation.154 Most importantly, arbitration is less antagonistic and reduces the stress and 
trauma that is frequently associated with litigation proceedings.155 
The analytical framework of the adversarial process is largely determined by the 
status that the court assigns to the embryo. The status dictates the legal rights and 
relevant issues that the court will consider in resolving the embryo dispute. While most 
courts adopt property deserving special respect status, the special respect classification 
148 Kessler, supra note 147, at 336. 
149 See Andre R. Imbrogno, Arbitration as an Alternative to Divorce Litigation: 
Redefining the Judicial Role, 31 CAP. U. L. REv. 413, 415 (2003); see also Kessler supra 
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has greater resemblance to plain property than human life. 156 However, many people 
would be reluctant to view embryos as plain property. 157 "Precisely because the early 
embryo is genetically unique and has the potential to be more, it operates as a powerful 
symbol ... of the unique gift of human existence."158 By virtue of being a powerful 
symbol of human existence, 159 embryos should not be simply placed under the umbrella 
of contract law. 
Embryo disputes revolve around highly personalized and diverse beliefs about 
origin of human life. The controversial nature of this issue makes it is improper for 
courts to uniformly impose "special respect" status upon every couple that enters the 
courtroom. Some couples strongly believe that embryo is human life and should never be 
destroyed. 160 Unfortunately, under the adversarial model, courts cannot consider 
individual beliefs of intended parents. 161 Instead, courts assign a particular status to the 
embryos and based on the assigned status, determine the nature of the associated 
progenitor rights.162 Legal precedent is created. Thereafter, that legal precedent will be 
binding upon every couple that enters the courtroom, irrespective of their individual 
beliefs. 163 
156 See supra note 31 and accompanying text for discussion of classifying embryos as 
property deserving special. 
157 Robertson, supra note 44, at 447. 
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To avoid imposition of highly ethical conclusions on individuals, every couple 
should be entitled to assign a status to their embryos. 164 Progenitors should be 
empowered to introduce their personal notions into the resolution process, since they are 
the ones who could ultimately attain parental responsibilities. 165 Taking embryo disputes 
outside the courtroom would avoid creation of legal precedent and allow for greater 
flexibility in the resolution process. 166 
Under the adversarial model, courts limit the scope of analysis to the constitutionally 
protected interests in privacy and specifically procreation. 167 However, focusing strictly 
on procreational rights substantially oversimplifies the nature of embryo disputes and 
diminishes parties' expectations of receiving a cognizant and fair resolution. Interests 
such as: progenitor's belief in embryo being human life, a woman's substantially greater 
physical and emotional burdens of undergoing IVF, emotional attachment to embryo, and 
best interests of embryo are precluded from consideration. 168 
Furthermore, the adversarial model ignores the "emotionally charged" nature of IVF 
process and the possibility of coercion or reliance being the major provoking factors in 
enduring IVF. 169 It seems innately unfair to deprive a female of her only chance to 
become a mother, when she desperately relied on her former spouse's consent for 
164 See Brunet & Craver, supra note 3, at 4. 
165 See Coleman, supra note 38, at 104-09. 
166 Brunet & Craver, supra note 3, at 6-10. 
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implantation prior to undergoing hysterectomy. 170 It would seem equally unfair to have a 
man, who was coerced into IVF by his ex-wife but finally gathered the courage to walk 
away from a dysfunctional relationship, to be forced into parenthood. 171 The adversarial 
model's inability to adequately account for situations, such as the ones mentioned above, 
is one of the reasons why the alternative dispute resolution model should be adopted. 172 
Under the alternate dispute resolution model, parties would be free to choose 
which interests are significant to the resolution of their particular dispute. 173 Progenitors 
would no longer be limited by the legally recognized interest in procreation and personal 
autonomy. 174 In arbitration, intended parents could introduce into the analysis their 
religious beliefs, which may not condone destruction of embryos. 175 Moreover, couples 
would finally have the ultimate decision-making authority that courts frequently 
emphasize but fail to provide. Releasing progenitors from the constraints of the 
adversarial process would truly empower them as the ultimate decision-makers. 176 
V. CONCLUSION 
The highly personalized nature of embryo disputes makes it extremely difficult 
for courts to arrive at satisfactory judicial resolutions. Rarely if ever do courts attempt to 
understand the specific circumstances of each couple's dispute. Instead, courts resort to 
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overly simplified tests that narrow the scope of disputes. Courts either limit the analysis 
to constitutional interests in procreation or relentlessly enforce prior directives without 
regard to progenitors' present intentions. Although, courts frequently proclaim their 
desires to vest the ultimate power in progenitors, in actuality, disputes are resolved based 
on judges' preconceived notions. Instead of providing progenitors with ample 
opportunity to determine the most suitable outcome, courts incessantly favor progenitors 
who desire to avoid procreation. 
The unequal treatment of progenitors partially stems from court's characterization 
of embryos as "property deserving special respect." Although courts have chosen a status 
that appears to accurately portray societal notions of embryos, in practice, "special 
respect" classification proved to be nothing other than plain property. Such an insensate 
treatment of embryos is very problematic, considering the controversy surrounding 
beliefs in origin of life. 
The inadequacies that are associated with the adversarial model can be effectively 
corrected by the alternative dispute resolution. Releasing embryo disputes from the 
adversarial constraints will furnish intended parents with power to influence the 
resolution process and the final decision. Progenitors will decide which issues and 
interests are relevant to resolution of their particular disputes. Moreover, intended 
parents will have complete discretion over classification of their embryos. By granting 
progenitors authority over disposition of their embryos, courts will not only avoid 
intrusions into sensitive and private matters but also allow couples to reach decisions that 
are tailored to their unique circumstances rather than legislative precedent. 
27 
